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Abstract 
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty and the Early Warning System represent the 
culmination of a long process of European treaties reform, among 
whose aims was to increase the EU democratic legitimacy. Which was 
not only undertaken through the enlargement of the European 
Parliament’s functions, but also through a greater involvement of 
National Parliaments in the EU decision-making process. However, the 
Treaty of Lisbon reaffirms the EU blindness toward the internal 
constitutional setting of its Member States and National Parliaments 
are treated equally, notwithstanding their powers and functions. 
Hence, the role of upper houses appears reinforced, because regardless 
of the internal constitutional setting of its Member States, the Early 
Warning System establishes an equal distribution of votes between the 
two houses of the parliament. Hence, the 13 Member States with a 
bicameral system cannot liberally assign the two votes according to the 
internal repartition of competencies, but rather the houses must have 
one vote each. 
 The aim of this research is to explore the impact of the 
Europeanisation process on upper houses and to assess their value in 
the Europeanisation discourse. Scrutinising the Italian, the UK and the 
German upper houses, the research stresses on the differential impact 
of Europeanisation and it elucidates that the diverse participation 
patterns reflect the profound heterogeneity of the institutional 
landscape of National Parliaments. In this respect, the research argues 
that the upper chambers which are more likely to promptly adapt to 
the impact of the Europeanisation process, both in terms of structural 
and procedural organisation and of active involvement in the EU 
decision-making process, are those characterised by two basic features: 
the non-partisan membership and the territorial representation of 
interests. However, it goes without saying that formal powers and 
party affiliation remain two essential factors. Moreover, as for the issue 
of executive accountability, the research, beyond the classical political 
cleavage, affirms the central role of upper chambers in taking the 
Government into account. In fact, the lack of the confidence vote 
xix 
 
assures the impartiality of the upper house, which is more likely to act 
independently from the executive. 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1 Framing the Research  
The Lisbon Treaty introduced important novelties to the European 
Union’s institutional framework. One of the most noticeable was the 
establishment of the so-called early warning system (thereafter EWS), 
which finally formalised the participation of the National Parliaments 
(thereafter NPs) in the European decision making process. The system 
provides to NPs the power to review EU draft legislative acts and to 
express concerns on subsidiarity directly to the European institutions 
through a written objection called reasoned opinion. The national 
legislatures acquired an individual power, because they do not depend 
on any other political actors to trigger the procedure. In this respect, 
reasoned opinions are calculated as votes, whose distribution differs 
between mono-cameral and bicameral parliaments. According to Art. 7 
(2) Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty “Each National 
Parliament shall have two votes, shared out on the basis of the national 
Parliamentary system. In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, 
each of the two chambers shall have one vote”.  
The Lisbon Treaty and the EWS represent the culmination of a long 
process of European treaties reform, among whose aims was to 
increase the EU democratic legitimacy. This was not only undertaken 
through the enlargement of the European Parliament’s functions, but 
also through a greater involvement of NPs in the EU decision-making 
process. Thus, over the time, NPs have been subject to several 
challenges and the EU system has always been characterised by its 
executive nature with a parliamentary marginalisation in the EU 
decision-making process. However, today, the Lisbon Treaty recognises 
the role of the NPs in the complex institutional architecture and calls 
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them to “contribute actively to the good functioning of the EU”. Since 
then, NPs have started to actively participate and establish a direct 
dialogue with the European institutions and the de-parliamentarisation 
thesis seems to be replaced by a change in the parliamentary attitude 
toward EU affairs. It is already given that not all NPs reacted in the 
same way, however despite the differences, a greater awareness arose 
and NPs have started to shape their institutional grounds and powers 
in accordance with the new European provisions. In this way, they 
stopped being just national actors and started recognising their new 
role, embedded in a wider a more complex constitutional setting.  
However, despite the above, the Lisbon Treaty reaffirms the EU 
blindness toward the internal constitutional setting of its Member 
States and NPs are treated equally (Art. 7(1) of the Protocol No. 2), 
notwithstanding their powers and functions in the State. In fact, in 
bicameral systems, the two votes are assigned regardless of their 
internal distribution of competences and regardless of the formal role 
played by each chamber in the national decision-making process. 
According to the Treaty provision, the votes cannot be liberally 
assigned in line with the national division of competences but rather, in 
a bicameral system, the houses must have one vote each (Art. 7(1) of 
the Protocol No. 2). In this way, the upper houses have seen their 
positions reinforced at the European level. Contrary to the fact that 
upper houses have usually fewer formal powers compared to the lower 
ones: e.g. the confidence relationship is prerogative of the sole lower 
house –except Italia and Romania- and upper houses usually play a less 
crucial role in the legislative process. Today, they have acquired an 
autonomous power to participate in the EU decision-making on equal 
footing with the lower ones, with important legal consequences in the 
national constitutional systems (Kiiver 2012).  
 
2 The Europeanisation of National 
Parliaments  
The role of the NPs in the European Union has always been 
associated with the widespread concern on EU democratic legitimacy 
(Marquand 1979, Hayward 1995; Anderson & Ellassen 1996; Norris 
1996; Majone 1996, 1998, 2006; Moravcsick 2002, 2004; Follesdal & Hix 
3 
 
2006), with scholarly debate focused on the ‘dual democratic deficit’ 
argument (Judge 1995). Accordingly, not only have Parliaments 
suffered from the transfer of power to the European level, but they 
were also characterised by an increased incapacity to control their own 
government on EU affairs (Auel 2006)1.  In other words,  NPs lost much 
of their legislative sovereignty and “policy areas that were formerly 
controlled by national parliaments [were] appropriated by executive 
and moved to the European level” (Ivy Orr 2003, 1; see also Norton 
1996a; Andersen & Burns 1996; Raunio 1999; Maurer & Wessels 2001; 
Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Hansen and Scholl 2002; Mittag & Wessels 2003; 
Auel 2005). In this first wave of the literature, scholars mainly focused 
on outlining the challenges to NPs ensuing from the progressive 
European integration (Judges 1995; Moravcsik 1994; Norton 1996a; 
Schmidt 1997; Wiberg 1997). Researches provided strong evidences that 
the Europeanisation process has fostered the so-called de-
parliamentarisation trend (Norton 1996a 1996b) and the national 
legislatures were widely considered as the “losers” of the European 
integration process (Maurer and Wessels 2001; Maurer, Mittag and 
Wessels 20032; Kassim 2005), with a twofold  impact on the decision 
making process. First, the policy agenda neither originated from a 
national programme nor was the result of an agreement between the 
national executive and its parliamentary majority. Secondly, the 
executives gained in terms of powers and autonomy, with parliaments 
                                                           
1 Auel pointed out that “National parliaments not only lack a formal role in EU 
decision-making, but the lack of transparency of Council negotiations, the 
highly technical nature of many EU documents and decisions, as well as the 
overall complicated policy processes within the European Union also create 
additional barriers against effective parliamentary scrutiny. National 
parliaments simply lack the resources necessary to effectively scrutinize their 
governments under these conditions.” (2006, 255) 
2 “Due to the growing supremacy of the national governments in the European 
decision-making process on the one hand and because of the governments’ 
capability to use the knowledge and powers of administrations on the other, 
national parliaments were left outside of the decision-making process or they 
were only marginally involved. Neither their financial nor their human 
resources could cope in any way with the still increasing amount of EU 
legislation –though in all national systems the formal legislative competencies 
are traditionally in the hands of parliaments” (Maurer, Mittag and Wessels 
2003, 71)  
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losing their capacity to control their own governments and to legislate 
over European policies. The upshot was a shift of power in favour of 
the executive, with an increased lack of transparency and 
accountability in the process (Lodge 1994; Héritier 2003; Auel 2007). 
Hence, a widespread consensus emerged that NPs needed to be 
more involved in EU policy-making (Katz and Wessels 1999; Schmidt 
2006; Strøm et al. 2003; O’Brennen 2007).  
In this direction, over time, there have been gradual steps aimed at 
reinforcing the role of the NPs in the EU institutional architecture 
(Hrbek 2012) and, since the Maastricht Treaty, several provisions have 
been introduced for strengthening parliamentary participation in EU 
policy-making. This progressive involvement of NPs in the EU 
triggered a new stand of research on the Europeanisation of NPs (Auel 
and Benz 2005; Wessels, Maurer and Mittag 2003). Scholars started 
analysing how NPs responded and adapted to the European 
integration process in institutional terms (Bergman 1997; Raunio 1999; 
Maurer and Wessels 2001; Kiiver 2006a 2006b; O’Brennan and Raunio 
2007). The focus was mainly on the role played by the European Affairs 
Committees (Bergman 1997; Dimitrakopoulos 2001Auel 2005) and on 
the formal provisions established both for scrutinising EU affairs and 
taking the national executives into account. The findings have always 
pointed out the differential impact of the Europeanisation process, with 
national legislatures ‘path-dependent’ (Benz 2004) to their national 
legal culture and tradition (Bergman 1997, 2000; Maurer and Wessels 
2001). Beside the institutional analysis, scholars started recognising that 
the formal provisions do not always give evidence about the effective 
scrutiny practice. In this regard, some part of the literature looked at 
the behavioural aspect (Holzhacker 2002; Benz 2004; Auel and Benz 
2005) and they started investigating the practical use of parliamentary 
prerogatives. Findings proved that some of the NPs considered among 
the strongest in terms of formal powers, in reality rarely made use of 
them. This approach was mainly focused on the executive-legislative 
relationship and the effective parliamentary capacity to hold the 
government into account (Auel 2005; Benz 2004Auel and Benz 2006). 
On this, scholars extrapolated the risk of the majoritarian trap in 
parliamentary systems, which leaves to the sole opposition party the 
duty to check over the executive (Holzhacher 2005; Auel 2007, 2009). 
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With this wider approach, scholars started investigating the cross-
national variation (Bergman 1997; Hansen and Scholl 2002; Holzhacker 
2005; Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005) through a comparative perspective 
and tried to create ranking which could depict the NPs strength in 
scrutinising EU affairs (Bergman 1997, 2000; Raunio 2005; Raunio and 
Wiberg 2010, Winzen 2012, 2013; Rozenberg and Tacea 2014). 
Today, since 1st December 2009, after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, a new wave of research has emerged, which reviews the 
classical ‘de-parliamentarisation’ thesis. In fact, through both the 
‘political dialogue’ and the EWS, NPs started to actively participate and 
establish a direct dialogue with the European institutions and the de-
parliamentarisation thesis seems to have been  replaced by a change in 
the parliamentary attitude toward EU affairs. Therefore, they stopped 
being just national actors and they started to recognise their new role, 
embedded in a wider, more complex constitutional setting. Thus, “over 
time  the ‘poor losers’ of integration have learned ‘to fight back’ and 
obtained stronger participation rights in the domestic handling of 
European policy” (Auel and Höing 2014).  
Although some studies have already diminished the initial 
enthusiasm (Kaczyński 2011; De Wilde 2012; Maatsch 2013), the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty undeniably increased – at least formally- 
the competences of NPs in the EU. NPs are thus under scrutiny and 
scholars are looking at how they can benefit from the novelties 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Manzella 2009) and more specifically, 
how they can be able to take advantage of the EWS (Kiiver 2008, 2012). 
Obviously, the NPs adaptation to the EU varies across countries 
(Bergman 1997; Maurer and Wessels 2001; Mittag Wessels and 
Wolfgang 2003; Saalfeld 2005; Raunio 2005; Kiiver 2006b; O’Brennen & 
Raunio 2007) and each case implies NPs’ ability to reform and adapt to 
the new provisions (Louis 2009; Matarazzo and Leone 2011; Kaczyński 
2011). 
Today, triggered also by the Euro-crisis (Lupo 2013c), the attention 
to NPs intensely increased and groups of scholars both from the 
political and legal field started gathering in order to compare their own 
knowledge and expertise on the topic (Hefftler, Neuhold, Rozenberg, 
Smith and Wessels 2014 forthcoming). Moreover, conferences and 
summer schools (Cartabia, Lupo and Simoncini 2013) were devoted to 
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the issue, involving both the political and the legal approach, which 
again proves the complexity of the issue and the need to adopt a wide 
approach for analysing the effective impact of the Europeanisation 
process on NPs (Winzen 2012).  
 
3 Upper Houses in the EU  
Despite the abundant literature on the Europeanisation of NPs, 
there is a substantial gap on the role of upper houses in the European 
decision-making process and most scholars have generally approached 
the issue, without exploring their potential role in the EU. Thus, most 
of the studies have neglected their role and NPs have been investigated 
as a sole actor, focusing just on the powers granted to the lower house. 
The main reason for this gap rests on the general misperception of their 
“secondary-ness” (Uhr 2006, 478) when compared to their “Big 
brother” (Scully 2001). In fact, while the latter has always been 
considered as the emblem of the democratic representation principle 
and thus the core of national decision-making process, the modes of the 
election of upper houses vary a lot according to the specific national 
constitutional settings. Despite this misperception, we should be aware 
that there is no such institutional creature as “insignificant 
bicameralism” (Liiphart 1999, 211). Where bicameralism exists, it 
always matters and “even unelected or indirectly elected upper houses 
with limited legislative powers can exercise great policy power” (Uhr 
2006, 478). This situation is termed “Cicero’s puzzle” (Money and 
Tsebelis 1992) and it refers to the “power able to be deployed by upper 
houses in the face of constitutional pre-eminence of lower houses” (Uhr 
2006, 478). 
The role of upper houses appears crucial also in the executive-
legislative relationship. Parliamentary systems are based on the special 
relation between legislative and executive branches, where ‘holding a 
gun to each other’s head’ (Gallager, Laver and Mair 1995, 43). The 
chamber can remove the executive with a vote of no confidence, while 
the executive may have the power to dissolve the legislature. This 
relationship –although some exceptions exist- is the prerogative of the 
lower house alone, while generally there is no principle of confidence 
vote in the upper house. In this respect, generally, the point of 
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departure for analysing the parliamentary form of government is the 
confidence relationship between the Parliament and the executive (Elia 
1956, 1957, 1960, 1960a; Rescigno 1967; Manzella 1969;  Olivetti 1996; 
Midiri 2006; Lupo 2008; Rivosecchi 2008; Lippolis 2011), which 
represents the legal prerequisite for assuring executive accountability. 
In other words, as Bagehot stressed, “it is the assembly which chooses 
our president” (1867) and thus the main function of Parliament is to 
safeguard that the holders of the executive power are accountable. In 
this way, the Government is called to give evidence to the legislature 
and to people on how it uses the power conferred to it. That is, “the 
holders of the executive power must be subjected to scrutiny and 
exposure to ensure that the power is properly employed” (Evans 2008) 
and if they try to implement policies that are opposed by the 
parliamentary majority, than the majority may vote the government out 
of office (Bagehot 1867; Beer 1966; Crick 1964; Wheare 1963; Mezey 
1979; Huber 1996; Frosini 2005).  
However, this is not always the case and there is a long standing 
debate on the declining role of the parliament (Bryce 1921a) and its 
capacity to hold the government to account. According to this 
argument, the Parliament’s capacity to control the executive has been 
weakened by the increasing role played by the party groups. According 
to Bryce “as party organisations are stronger, the discretion of 
representatives is narrowed, they must vote with their leaders” (1921a), 
this has led to government dominance of the legislature. This argument 
was further supported by Wheare, who writing in the mid-1960s 
argued that “if a general survey is made of the position and working of 
legislatures in the present century, it is apparent that, with a few 
important and striking exceptions, legislatures have declined in certain 
important respects and particularly in powers in relation to the 
executive government” (Wheare 1967, p. 148). This argument has been 
challenged because of lack of empirical data (Mezey, 1995, p. 196) and 
Norton has also stressed that the executive-legislative relationship 
should be analysed in a wider context taking into account internal and 
external factors (1998). Using his own words, “in terms of policy effect, 
perceptions of ‘decline’ have also not been borne out in recent years 
[…] Contrary to what we hypothesised, parliament has avoided the 
extremes of marginalisation in the policy cycle. This is not to assert that 
parliament has witnessed some accretion of policy-making power […] 
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What it does assert is that parliament has not slipped back, and 
certainly not collapsed, to the extent that many critics feared” (Norton, 
1990, p. 31).  
Despite the different positions with regard the declining powers of 
the legislatures and the way it should be assessed (Lupo 2001), what 
appears largely acknowledged is the general trend of an increasing role 
of the executive over parliament, which, dominated by the logic of the 
party system, it limits the individual independence of the MPs. In fact, 
the reinforcement of the party organisation and the general tendency to 
ensure cohesiveness (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998) has led to the 
establishment of party discipline, which obliges MPs to vote in line 
with their own party, and  thus with the government, when the party 
represents the majority in the parliament3. In this sense, particularly in 
majoritarian democracies, it is largely perceived that there has been a 
substantial change in the role of the parliament. That is, rooted in the 
logic of party majority and its loyalty to the executive, the parliament 
seems to have stopped to perform its role of controller (Strøm 2000; 
Strøm et al. 2003) and it has become an instrument in the hands of the 
executive government for implementing its own policies (Carrer 2011). 
In other words, “instead of executive governments being responsible to 
parliaments, parliaments have become responsible to executive 
governments. The body which is supposed to be scrutinised and 
controlled by parliament has actually come to control the body which is 
supposed to be doing the scrutinising and controlling - a reversal of 
roles” (Evans 1992). This is particularly evident in the UK 
parliamentary system, where already in 1976, Lord Hailsham described 
the British system of government as an ‘elective dictatorship’4.  
                                                           
3 On the notion of Majoritarian democracy see Bobbio 1995, Pasquino 1995, 
Lijphart 1999, Bartole 2001, Chessa 2004,  
4“Until recently the powers of government within parliament were largely 
controlled  either by the opposition or by its own backbenchers. It is now 
largely in the hands of the government machine, so that the government 
controls the parliament, and not parliament the government. Until recently, 
debate and argument dominated the  parliamentary scene. Now it is the whips 
and party caucus. More and more, debate  is becoming a ritual dance, 
sometimes interspersed with catcalls... we live under an  elective dictatorship, 
absolute in theory, if hitherto tolerable in practice” Lord Hailsham cited in 
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These patterns have been strongly accentuated by the European 
integration process (Fabbrini 2000). According to the majoritarian logic 
introduced above, the capacity of the Parliament to scrutinise its own 
government becomes more complicated in EU affairs. On this point, 
two positions emerged. On the one hand, some scholars have 
underlined that the European integration process and, today, the 
introduction of the EWS would represent a threat for the same 
principle of parliamentary democracy, since it could lead the national 
parliament to be in opposition with its own government (Raunio 2007, 
86). On the other hand, other academics have pointed out that although 
in European affairs NPs can be more likely to have a stronger 
motivation to control their governments, in practice they do not, 
because “the majority party or coalition which holds the veto power” 
(Auel and Benz 2005, 375) will not use it publicly. Because, “the result 
would be similar to a defeat of a government bill, namely a public and 
therefore humiliating opposition to the government by its own 
parliamentary majority, something the majority will usually have no 
incentive to risk, because it may undermine their own political 
credibility”(Auel 2007, 492). “Thus, the views of the cabinet and of the 
parliament, in the sense of the majority in at least the lower chamber, 
tend to coincide” (Kiiver 2009, 1293). 
It becomes evident that the duty to check over the executive relies 
only in the hands of the opposition5, which mainly in majoritarian 
democracies has a tough task (Pasquino 1995) and can “force the 
executive to defend publicly what has proposed” (Mezey 1998, 784; see 
also Saalfeld 2005). At this point, it should be specified what is the 
meaning of opposition and to what usually we refer. According to the 
Resolution 1601, adopted on 23 January 2008, by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)6, the opposition is 
described as “an essential component of a well-functioning democracy” 
                                                                                                                               
(Prasse 2009). For an analysis of ‘elective dictatorship’ see and Aldons 2002; 
Evans 1992 
5 Contrary to this argument see Lupo 2008 
6 Procedural guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in a 
democratic parliament 
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and the definition is restricted to the party political opposition7. More 
specifically, the Venice Commission argued that: 
“The defining characteristic of the “opposition” is that it is not in power, and 
that it opposes (more or less strongly) those who are. The parliamentary 
opposition then consists of those political parties that are represented in 
parliament, but not in government, since in most (but not all)  parliamentary 
systems the government will usually enjoy the direct support of the majority”8. 
Starting from this definition, this research wants to enlarge the 
concept of ‘opposition’, bringing it beyond the political cleavage 
between minority and majority parties in parliament. Hence, the notion 
of ‘opposition’ can be broadly understood as the “dialectic 
contraposition with regards the established power” (De Vergottini 
1973, 1), which opens up the concept and allows the introduction of the 
upper houses in the political arena, and specifically in the dilemma of 
executive accountability.  
 
4 The Focus of the Research  
The aim of this research is to explore the impact of the 
Europeanisation process on upper houses and specifically to look at the 
first effects of the new provisions established by the Lisbon Treaty.  
In this regard, the role of upper houses appears reinforced, because 
regardless of the internal constitutional setting of its Member States, the 
EWS establishes an equal distribution of votes between the two houses 
of the parliament. According to the procedure, the vote cannot be 
liberally assigned but rather, in bicameral systems, the houses must 
have one vote each. In this way, the upper houses have reinforced their 
positions and contrary to the fact that, usually, they have fewer formal 
                                                           
7 For an analysis of the parliamentary opposition see De Vergottini 1973; 
Zucchini 1983; Massari and Pasquino 1990; Manzella 1990; Gennusa 2000; 
Rizzoni 2012 
8 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Venice Commission 
(2010), Report on the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament, CDL-
AD(2010)025, Venice 15-16 October 2010 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2010)025-e  
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powers with respect the lower ones, today, they have acquired an 
autonomous power to participate on equal footing into the EU 
decision-making process.  
Under these preliminary considerations, some scholars have 
predicted a potential “rise of the Senates” (Kiiver 2012) at the EU level, 
with a positive implication for the decision making process. Because 
“Senates which are more independent from the cabinet than lower 
chambers in fact offer a greater prospect that their opinion will not 
merely be a repetition of what the government thinks already, and they 
can thus potentially add further ideas to the discourse” (Kiiver 2012, 
66).  
The aim of this research is to testfy this prediction and to verify in 
which cases it should be expected. However, against any risk of any 
generalisation this research stresses on the differential domestic 
adaptation to the European integration process (Bergman 1997; Maurer 
and Wessels 2001; Mittag, Wessels and Wolfgang 2003; Saalfeld 2005; 
Raunio 2005; Kiiver 2006b; O’Brennen and Raunio 2007). In fact, the 
institutional landscape of NPs is profoundly heterogeneous (Kiiver 
2012; Kaczyński, 2011; Olivetti 2013, Lupo 2013, 2013a9, 2013b). This 
                                                           
9 Interesting is the observation developed by Lupo on the use of the term 
‘National Parliaments’ instead than ‘Parliaments of Member States’ “It is, in 
fact, well-known how the phenomenon of European integration is generally 
placed in contraposition to the nationalistic tendencies which have long 
prevailed throughout the continent, and how the development of this 
phenomenon, following forms and modalities which differ greatly from the 
traditional character of inter-national organisations, often tends to be 
considered as one of the indices of the overcoming of the logic of the nation-
state in the contemporary world. It thus comes as no surprise that the entire 
European construct has endeavoured – and, indeed, continues to endeavour – 
to resist the call to a return to every form of terminology that makes explicit 
reference to the idea of the nation (especially where it is conceived in an ethno-
linguistic manner). And yet, contrary to this tendency, the term “national” re-
appears, in the European treaties, precisely in the very discipline addressed to 
those who, with more neutral terms which are only slightly more articulate, 
could have been called the “Parliaments of the Member States”. This essentially 
seems to be due to practical identification reasons, which establish the need to 
distinguish, with a concise and unambiguous formula, every reference to such 
parliaments with regard to those made at the European Parliament and also 
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heterogeneity is far more evident in bicameral systems, where diversity 
has been the rule over time and among the countries: “bicameral 
institutions have been adopted by class societies and by federal states, 
by republican polities and by unitary political systems. They have been 
used to maintain the status quo, to amalgamate the preferences of 
different constituencies, and to improve legislation, and have been 
justified in all of these terms” (Tsebelis and Money 1997, 13). 
Thus, completely sharing the positive implications that the 
independent role of upper houses may bring to the EU institutional 
architecture. This research does not  expect a general “rise of the 
Senate”, but rather the active participation of the upper houses is 
expected to be contingent upon the existence of some specific 
conditions, which reflects the aims of the active involvement of NPs in 
EU affairs.  
Specifically, two approaches can be depicted: the European oriented 
approach and the national oriented approach. According to the first, 
the will to actively participate in the EU decision-making process is 
boosted by two opposing reasons. On the one side, the effective 
participation is seen as a way to contribute to the legitimation of the 
European Union. On the other side, active participation is fostered by a 
more eurosceptic stance. As for the national-oriented approach, also in 
this case, a twofold attitude can be depicted. The first aims towards 
preserving the national prerogatives and the active participation in the 
EU, and is seen as a tool for checking over the national government’s 
decision. The second sees the active participation as an “opportunity 
structure” (Neuhold and Streklov 2012), that is an instrument to extend 
the national prerogatives and reinforce its role also at the national level.  
Obviously, it is very difficult to draw a precise line between the two 
approaches, but rather the positions of each House can be a mixture of 
both. 
Having set this premise, the research argues that the upper 
chambers which are more likely to promptly adapt to the impact of the 
Europeanisation process, both in terms of structural and procedural 
organisation and of active participation in the EU decision-making 
                                                                                                                               
those which, as we have just seen, Article 6 of Protocol 2 defines as “regional 
parliaments with legislative powers” (2013b) 
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process, are those characterised by two basic features: the non-partisan 
membership and the territorial representation of interests. The first 
represents an important assumption which overcomes the majoritarian 
trap and goes beyond the classical political cleavage of majority and 
opposition. The second, although related to the first, is rooted in the 
territorial bicameral model, which is a distinguishing, but not essential, 
trait of federal systems. 
Referring to the issue of executive accountability, mainly political 
scientists have devoted special consideration to the issue. Specifically, 
using the standard model of delegation in agency theory (Saalfeld 2000, 
2003, 2005; Strøm et al. 2003; Auel 2005; Sprungk 2010), they have tried 
to identify the main variables which could better grasp the executive-
legislative relationship and they focused on the reasons why some 
parliaments “invest more resources in holding their governments 
accountable in matters relating to the European Union” (Raunio 2005, 
319). 
Scholars unanimously agree that the basic and essential feature for 
assuring accountability is access to information (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991; Krehbiel 1991; Lupia 2003; Strøm et al. 2003; Auel 
2005), which ensures that parliaments can effectively evaluate the 
executive’s decisions. One of the main problems related to EU affairs is 
indeed the information asymmetries between the executives and their 
own NPs. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, parliaments’ 
access to information has been strongly improved, however domains 
still persist where decisions are taken behind closed doors and through 
informal negotiations. This asymmetry is far more evident with regards 
EU ‘limité’ documents, where NPs access often relies on the will of the 
national executives. It follows that the full access to information 
remains one of the basic feature for assuring a stronger participation of 
NPs in the EU decision-making process and reinforce the chain of 
accountability. In other words, “in order to enhance the elected 
representative’s accountability to the electorate, citizens need 
information about their representatives’ decision-making and the 
outcomes of their decisions” (Héritier 2003, 814). 
Having said this, scholars have tried to explore in detail the 
executive-legislative relationship and the capability of legislatures to 
hold their governments to account. According to Bergman “the 
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strength of the parliament is often the reverse of government strength” 
(1997, 381). It follows that in countries with minority governments “the 
parliament can have a greater influence over policy than where the 
government controls a majority of the votes in the parliament” (1997, 
381), which implies a higher ability to scrutinise and limit the 
executive’s discretion in the European decision-making process (Judge 
1995). Based on the same political cleavage, Auel stressed on the limits 
of a majoritarian parliamentary system and acknowledged the 
parliamentary majority and the political opposition as two distinct 
political agents, playing a different role in scrutinising the executive. 
On the one side, the majority –supporting the government- is inclined 
to play a limited ‘monitoring scrutiny’10. On the other side, the duty of 
the parliamentary opposition would be to engage in the so-called 
‘political scrutiny’, that “involves the second stage of assessment and 
political judgement on the appropriateness of the government’s 
decision and the respective outcome of European negotiations” (2005, 
500). Starting from this central notion, other scholars have tried to 
measure the level of parliamentary scrutiny and to explain the main 
patterns of cross variation among Member States. Rozenberg 
scrutinised the impact of public opinion, minority governments and the 
role of the parliament in the national system on the level of scrutiny 
(2002). Pahre identified three essential conditions for resilient 
parliamentary oversight: “there must be a significant portion of the 
public, and at least one party represented in parliament, that prefers 
the status quo to further integration. Second, a country must have 
frequent minority governments. Third, there must be some party that 
would rather enjoy a policy veto through an oversight committee than 
join a majority government” (1997, 165). Raunio investigated five 
variables: the power of parliament independent of integration, public 
                                                           
10 “i.e. the demand for information on the agent’s actions and their context to 
reduce information asymmetries, is of particular importance in European 
policy making, as national parliaments, or, more specifically, the majority 
parties, are not directly involved in decision making at the European level. […] 
both the agenda setting and decision making take place at the European level. 
As a result, European proposals may well have policy aims that counter 
domestic policy preferences. We can therefore expect the majority parties, too, 
be highly motivated to question their government on the context of decision 
making […]” (Auel 2005, 500) 
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opinion on membership, party positions on integration, frequency of 
minority government and political culture (2005). 
All of those studies have tried to capture the strength of the NPs in 
holding the government into account in EU affairs, with an extensive 
analysis of both the parliamentary political dialectic and the national 
constitutional constrains. However, all of them have failed to capture 
the different structural organisation of parliamentary systems, 
neglecting to mark the distinction between mono-cameral and 
bicameral parliaments. It follows that so far scholars have looked 
mainly at the lower chamber, even when a bicameral structure was in 
place. The reason resides on the assumption that the lower chamber has 
always been considered as the emblem of the democratic 
representation principle and thus the core of the national decision-
making process. Moreover, specifically in the executive-legislative 
relationship, the confidence vote is deemed to be one of the strongest 
legal mechanism for assuring executive accountability, which generally 
is prerogative of the lower chamber alone, while -although some 
exceptions exist- there is no confidence vote in the upper chamber.  
This research argues that the lack of the confidence vote implies 
important consequences in terms of relationships with the executive 
and with the EU institutions. And what it should be made clear is that 
it does not weaken the position of the upper house with respect to the 
executive, but rather the absence of this legal prerogative assures the 
impartiality of the house, which is more likely to act independently 
from the executive and it “may therefore provide an important forum 
for parliamentary scrutiny, strengthening parliament’s overall control 
over government” (Russell 2001a, 448; see also Druckman Martin and 
Thies 2005; Russell and Sanford 2002). 
This assumption is expected to be evident in those upper houses 
which are characterised by two basic features: the non-partisan 
membership and the territorial representation of interests.  
The two features are both rooted in the main theoretical justification 
of bicameralism, that is representation, and although they are not 
dependent on each other and neither are mutually exclusive, it is 
important to stress that upper houses based on a different 
representation pattern than the one established in the lower one are 
more likely to effectively control the executive. However, it should be 
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further underlined that the national legal provisions which set the 
mode of composition and election of upper chambers, do not 
necessarily assure the political independence of the house. Hence, an 
in-depth analysis, which takes into account both the legal provisions 
and the political reality, is essential for considering some possible 
deviations. In other words, the formal provisions do not completely 
illustrate the real role played by the upper house and also in the 
presence of a federal house, the political relationship should be careful 
investigated, since, contrary to its formal provisions, in some cases the 
house might not be able to effectively represent the territorial interests 
and, on the contrary, be influenced by the national political cleavage, 
falling into the majoritarian trap. Thus, the territorial representation 
should be effective.  
To sum up, the non-partisan membership and the ‘effective’ 
territorial representation are the two essential features for an 
independent chamber, which could assure an effective parliamentary 
scrutiny.  
Bearing in mind the abovementioned premise, this research focuses 
on three main features. First, it looks at how upper houses have 
adapted to the challenges posed by the move toward greater 
integration. On this issue, this research investigates the impact of 
Europeanisation on institutional terms and specifically on its structural 
and procedural organisation. Moreover, aware of the fact that the 
process of adaptation has been slow and problematic, this research 
takes an historical perspective and points out the evolutionary and 
continuous process of change, which better promises to shed some light 
on the impact of the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Second, 
this research investigates the impact of Europeanisation on executive-
legislative relationship and specifically on upper houses’ capacity to 
scrutiny and direct government decision-making. Finally, the last focus 
is on inter-chamber relationship and the aim is to look at the possible 
impact on the core of the bicameral system. This analysis scrutinises 
how the two houses deal with EU issues and to which extent their 
internal structure and procedures differ from each other.  
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5 Methodology  
The present research is placed in the field of comparative 
constitutional law and the innovative aspect of the research lies in 
connecting the fields of constitutional law and political science. The aim 
is thus to link the legal analysis of the formal prerogatives and powers 
recognised to upper houses with an empirical evaluation of their actual 
operation in political practice. 
Accordingly, the research relies on constitutional literature and 
parliamentary documents. It investigates the formal powers of upper 
houses in the national constitutional framework and it examines the 
provisions enacted for assuring both the participation in the EU 
decision-making process and for checking over national executives’ 
decisions. Besides this legal approach, the research verifies the effective 
operation of the formal prerogatives. This is mainly done through the 
use of data available on NPs’ and European Commission’s websites.  
The most important choice made in this research was with respect 
the case selection. Among the 13 bicameral systems in the European 
Union, the first choice was to focus on Member States characterised by 
a Parliamentary form of government. The main reason was strictly 
dependent on the need to capture a similar balance of power among the 
national institutional actors. Second, the research is specifically focused 
on upper houses and thus it was decided to exclude all of those houses 
which scrutinise EU matters and participate in the EU decision making 
process, through shared structure and procedure with the lower ones. 
Finally, although timing of accession is considered one important factor 
for understanding the differential impact of Europeanisation, it was 
decided to exclude all the new Member States. This choice was justified 
on the fact that most of the new Member States with a bicameral 
structure are still characterised by weak institutional actors and 
unstable democracies (i.e. Romania), which makes it difficult to 
effectively grasp the internal distribution of powers among the 
branches of government. Moreover, being one of the first researches 
specifically focused on the Europeanisation of upper houses, it was 
considered essential to limit the field of investigation to some specific 
patterns. 
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Following those criteria, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany 
were retained for the purpose of this research. Moreover, the choice 
also respects the classical Hirschl’s principle of case selection based on 
the “most different cases” logic (2005). In fact, the upper houses of the 
three countries strongly differ in terms of composition and functions: 
the Italian Senate is rooted in a symmetric bicameral system with both 
houses retaining the confidence relationship with the executive; the UK 
House of Lords is rooted in the elitist bicameral model, with few formal 
powers to control over the executive; finally, the German Bundesrat 
represents the essence of an upper chamber representing territorial 
interests and rooted in a strong federal system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
